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he overall task for this special issue is to assess the emergency response to terrorism, in 
particular the threat posed by violent jihadist terrorism. Clearly, planning for emergency 
responses will have value against other threats and hazards, so it will be difficult to separate 
out the arrangements made to deal specifically with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, and those to 
meet other emergencies, for example major natural disasters. A sense of proportion is also needed 
when examining terrorist risks: the actions of greedy market-makers and incompetent bankers in the 
recent past is doing much more damage to our national welfare and national security than terrorism 
today.
Emergency response of one kind or another has been part of this author’s working life, in the 
Ministry of Defence, as Permanent Secretary in the Home Office and finally as Permanent 
Secretary in the Cabinet Office where one of the duties of the UK Security and Intelligence 
Coordinator was to be the UK chief crisis manager operating from the Cabinet Office Briefing 
Rooms, or COBR[1] –arrangements that for managing the response to terrorist incidents date back 
to the early 1970s when a different form of international terrorism was concerning the world after 
the attack by Black September on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games.
Governments tend to dislike the term ‘crisis’ and prefer a term like ‘disruptive challenge’. Crisis 
implies that events are out of control and headlines about chaos are not far away. Three words 
‘Crisis, what crisis’ in the Sun headline helped destroy the reputation of the Labour government in 
1979, even though the man generally thought to have uttered them – Prime Minister Jim Callaghan 
on the steps of his returning aircraft from the Guadeloupe economic summit - did not in fact do so. 
But the words caught the popular mood that the government had lost control during the 1979 Winter 
of Discontent with rubbish piling up in the streets and inflation rocketing. Today, national security 
itself can be defined [2] as a state of confidence on the part of the public that the major risks, be 
they malign threats or natural hazards, are being satisfactorily managed so that people can get on 
with making the most of their lives, freely and with confidence. For example, for a few days in 
August 2011 public confidence in the ability of the authorities to provide them with security was 
shaken in the face of the rioting and looting in English towns and cities. Public protection thus 
requires that there are effective emergency responses available against the widest range of major 
threats and hazards. Those responses in turn depend upon prior investment in the resilience of 
society and its critical infrastructure and networks, human as well as electronic. All emergencies are 
local in impact, a fact reflected in the provisions of the UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004 with its 
local resilience fora.
In considering how the nation can best respond to the terrorist threat it is illuminating to start with 
the experience, good and bad, of the last decade, applying the benefit of some historical distance 
from the attacks on 9/11. That learning can provide perspective in assessing how well the UK has 
done in responding to the threat, especially relating to emergency response capability.
T
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It is a common finding of studies into crisis management that emergencies arise through two 
different routes: ‘Sudden Impact’ and ‘Rising Tide’.[3] With ‘Sudden Impact’ events such as the 
bombs on the London transport system on 7/7, the Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands or 
the Icelandic Ash Cloud external events burst upon us. There is no doubt in such cases that 
government faces an emergency and will be expected to respond promptly.
With ‘Rising Tide’ situations such as the UK foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2000 or the severe 
flooding in the West of England in 2008 the scale of emergency may not at first be apparent. 
Normal procedures have swung into action and only over time does it become apparent that the 
situation is beyond control and that emergency measures – bringing in the Armed Forces to help 
with the response, for example – are needed. The key, of course, to managing such situations is to 
have sufficiently early detection of the rising trouble so that the response can be organised before 
the situation worsens to crisis proportions. That is different from having early warning of the 
likelihood of trouble arising in the first place, allowing such advance measures as construction of 
flood barriers or the stockpiling of vaccines and planning mutual assistance between police forces.
That distinction between types of emergency can be applied, albeit crudely, to the UK and the US 
experience of terrorism over the last decade.
First of all, the threat from jihadist terrorism crept up on the public at the end of the last century as a 
‘rising tide’ rather than a ‘sudden impact’.
The first AQ car bomb attack on the World Trade Centre was in 1993. In the same year, the PIRA 
attacked Warrington gas works killing two children and then detonated a huge truck bomb in 
Bishopsgate causing around £1billion of damage. The AQ Bojinka plot in the mid–1990s was to kill 
4000 people on airliners to be brought down in the Pacific. In that period PIRA set off huge bombs 
in South Quay in London’s docklands then in the Arndale centre in Manchester. The US was 
becoming increasingly concerned with jihadist terrorism with the US Embassy bombings in Dar es 
Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, but political attention in the UK was understandably focussed on a 
PIRA ceasefire and the developing Northern Irish peace process.
The police and Security Service did monitor the radical preachers and known jihadist extremists, 
who were often motivated by anger over Kashmir – or, for some, the earlier plight of the Bosnian 
Muslims, or repression in Algeria and Chechnya. Bin Laden did have what was described as ‘the 
media wing of Al Qaida’ [4] in the UK and he gave interviews to the Al Quds al-Arabia newspaper 
based in London in 1996 and 1998 announcing his so-called fatwas declaring war on the Zionists 
and Western crusaders. The activities of Bin Laden were thus certainly a target for the specialists in 
the intelligence services, but AQ was not in the late 1990s a household term as the Provisional IRA 
was. It can be too readily forgotten that the first UK jihadist plot was disrupted in November 2000 
when a Birmingham house and nearby lock-up were found to contain bomb-making instructions, 
equipment, and 100 kg of the chemical components of the explosive HTMD. But the major dangers 
from the ‘rising tide’ of jihadism were seen to be overseas.
So before 9/11, the jihadist terrorist threat to the UK itself was thought to be manageable by the 
level of response then available. In a similar way, despite the evidence of the earlier AQ attack on 
the World Trade Centre, the US assessed the the rising tide of threat to be to primarily to US 
interests overseas, which is where the centre of gravity of US intelligence effort was focussed.
9/11 changed all that. It was the ‘sudden impact’ emergency writ large. The politics of terrorism 
changed overnight with the unfolding into political and public consciousness of what Fawaz Gerges 
later called [5] the AQ strategy to attack the ‘Far Enemy’ in our own homelands. The impact on the 
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US – ‘the Pearl Harbor effect’ – was especially traumatic. The British public – in spite of the PIRA 
experience – shared then the fear of the enemy in hiding waiting to strike.
Public apprehension was heightened by the recognition that such suicidal jihadists would not have 
hesitated to use a dirty bomb or bio-terror weapon if they had them, or even a nuclear weapon if 
passed on by a rogue state. Western advanced societies appeared fragile and vulnerable, so 
improving resilience and emergency planning suddenly became a priority for government. The 
psychological ripples from the 9/11 impact spread of course much wider. For Tony Blair, as he 
explained to the Chilcot inquiry [6] , it was no longer prudent to wait for the proliferator to develop 
his weapons and for the enemy to strike the first blow.
The attacks on 9/11 provided the most dramatic call to arms possible to young radicals in Muslim 
communities around the world, stimulating them to action, some in conjunction with AQ planners, 
others largely independently. The prompt allied intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 destroyed the 
AQ training camps and infrastructure that were turning out a steady output of a small number of 
determined professional terrorists, as well as larger numbers of foot-soldiers. That was very 
necessary for Western security. But one of the unwelcome consequences was the flight of AQ 
leaders to the FATA in Pakistan, making contacts easier between British based extremists of 
Pakistani descent, who could easily travel legitimately to Pakistan, and terrorist facilitators and 
trainers in Pakistan such as Rashid Rauf. The UK security authorities began to see more and more 
domestic networks of jihadist activists, with increasing talk of action against the UK itself.
That rise in domestic activism unfortunately coincided with the highly controversial 2003 US/UK 
invasion of Iraq that acted as an accelerant on young hot heads, as the JIC had warned it would if 
the UK joined the invasion. The effect was intensified by the imagery of the bloody aftermath of 
occupation, which the rapidly expanding internet carried globally.
UK extremists actively sought ways of getting involved in violent jihad and travelled to Pakistan to 
seek contacts and support. This bottom-up pressure to join the movement was of course eagerly 
exploited by AQ facilitators and planners. This was the period of a number of serious AQ-facilitated 
terrorist plots against the UK such as the terrorist plan to down half a dozen aircraft in the Atlantic 
using liquid explosives smuggled onboard in soft drinks bottles that would have killed more US 
citizens than on 9/11.[7]
The overall effect of these developments was to create a “severe” domestic threat of jihadist 
violence, meaning that a terrorist attack at any time was judged by the authorities (in JTAC) as 
highly likely. It would of course have been unrealistic to expect the security authorities to be able to 
frustrate every plot in advance. Met Commissioner John Stevens notoriously said to the media it 
was a question of when, not if. The London attacks when they came on 7/7 did not therefore arrive 
as a strategic surprise. Emergency responses had been prepared for just such an eventuality, 
including a live exercise at Bank Underground station. As Lady Justice Hallett’s 7/7 inquest 
concluded, however, despite their best efforts the security authorities were still caught by tactical 
surprise.
Commentators sometimes write about the attacks on London transport on 7/7 as the UK’s “wake-
up” call over jihadist terrorism. That would not be true of the government and the security and 
intelligence community - and the media correspondents. They knew how close the nation had come 
in previous years to terrorist mass murder by the Crevice gang or by Richard Reid, the shoe bomber. 
The decision to increase greatly spending and effort on counter-terrorism had been taken two years 
before, including doubling the size of the Security Service, building new joint arrangements with 
the police outside London and investing heavily in the emergency services. It was, however, only in 
2006 well after 7/7 that the UK government first published [8] a comprehensive account in a White 
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Paper of the counter-terrorist strategy CONTEST it had been following since 2003. So perhaps 
more might have been done to educate the public before 7/7 as to what the government was actually 
doing to keep them safe.
Continuing the narrative, the occupation of Iraq eventually ended. AQ in Iraq did not succeed in 
gaining power and were denounced by the Sunni community. A series of plots in the UK were 
uncovered and pre-empted or were launched but failed in their intent– perhaps as many as a dozen 
after 7/7 - and notable arrests and convictions followed. That pace of work by the security 
authorities has not faltered, and significant arrests continue to be made and suspects charged with 
terrorist offences.
In recent years, under President Obama, the intensified US intelligence-led drone and covert CT 
campaign has removed most of the top leadership of AQ in the FATA and elsewhere (and of course 
most recently killed Bin Laden himself in Pakistan). AQ’s senior leadership has lost most of its 
major figures. The movement is more dispersed. It has also, in the eyes of the Arab street, been 
shown to be largely irrelevant to the Arab Spring in North Africa and Egypt, reducing its ideological 
appeal worldwide including the UK. The jihadist terrorist threat has shifted, with attention now 
focussed on Al Shabaab in Somalia and most recently on the Boko Haram group in Northern 
Nigeria. AQ supporters are engaged in active insurgency in Yemen, and some of them also have had 
contacts with would-be terrorists in the UK. In the UK there should be a sense of relief (whatever 
views may be held about the manner in which it happened) that their leader, Anwar al-Awlaki is 
dead, killed by a drone strike. He was the man behind the 2010 printer cartridge bombs one of 
which was recovered at East Midlands airport before it was able to explode. He was also editor of 
Inspire magazine, a glossy webzine that radicalised the ‘lone wolf’, Roshonara Chowhary, in her 
attempt to murder Stephen Timms MP as well as other would-be terrorists as evidence to recent 
court cases has shown.
The official UK jihadist threat level was reduced last year from severe to substantial – although this 
still means that a terrorist attack is a strong possibility (Olympic planning for 2012 is prudently 
based on the assumption that it could rise again to severe). It is also prudent to recall that the 
dissident Irish republicans have ambitions to cause trouble here. It would nevertheless be 
reasonable to look back over the last decade and reach the conclusion that, overall, the UK and the 
US are safer today than on the eve of 9/11, when it must be remembered AQ had its bases and 
training camps in Afghanistan, and had a cadre of dedicated and experienced terrorist operational 
planners to call on.
A more penetrating question would be to ask whether the UK government over-reacted over the last 
decade due to exaggerated perceptions of the AQ threat? Overall, my response would be in the 
negative. If anything, the authorities can be criticized for not pressing for a major increase in the 
security and resilience effort a little earlier. Although the number of deaths of British citizens 
caused by jihadist terrorism over the decade is, thankfully, small in relation to other everyday risk 
such as traffic accidents things would look very different if even a few of the major plots had 
succeeded.
The hard, counter-factual, question is, of course, whether the UK could have been even safer after 
9/11 if different counter-terrorism and foreign policies had been adopted. There can be more than 
one point of view on the matter. Iraq did worsen the radicalization process, although it did not 
create it. Bush-era rendition and interrogation policies helped create a sense of double standards 
over key Western values of freedom, democracy and human rights. The very term ‘war on terror’ 
may have helped create a sense of an inevitable conflict between the West and the world of Islam. 
Some measures in UK counter-terrorism legislation may have been counter-productive in 
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discouraging active intelligence cooperation from Muslim communities. There may therefore have 
been a higher price paid than need have been, but that is with the benefit of hindsight. Events never 
appear so clear at the time and – for example – had the US not acted against the AQ leadership and 
the US not been prepared to share its intelligence with the British authorities, and vice-versa, who 
can tell what attacks might have taken place?
The prevailing approach to domestic security planning in the UK after 9/11 was heavily influenced 
by the growing application of risk management as a planning tool in government generally. Risk 
management was built in to the British counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, that the author 
launched in November 2002. That driving logic may well be the main reason why CONTEST is 
still in force today under its third prime minister.
The CONTEST strategy used the risk equation to identify the different ways in which the risk to the 
public from terrorism can be reduced. The index of risk can be taken to be the product of different 
factors: likelihood of attack x vulnerability to attack x initial impact of an attack x duration of 
disruption that would result from an attack. Likelihood is reduced through strategic campaigns to 
improve intelligence and law enforcement to uncover terrorist networks and bring them to justice 
(Pursue) and by tackling the process of radicalization into violent extremism (Prevent). 
Vulnerability of critical infrastructure, transport etc is reduced by investing in protective security 
(Protect) and the impact and duration of disruption is minimized by improving the emergency 
response (Prepare). The CONTEST strategic aim reflects the risk management approach by having 
the objective being ‘to reduce the risk’ from terrorism so that people could go about their normal 
business, freely (that is, without having to interfere with individual freedoms and liberties) and with 
confidence (that is, with people still travelling by air and on the underground, visitors coming to the 
UK, confidence in the markets and so on). A very different approach from the US “war on terror” 
strategy, that sought risk elimination in relation to AQ.
As a result of all these measures, in addition to reducing the likelihood of a successful attack, the 
UK’s vulnerability as a society to terrorism has been significantly reduced. Aviation security 
measures, improved building standards, new surveillance technology, protection for the finance 
sector and other critical national infrastructure, all the measures being put in place for the Olympics 
in 2012 help reduce the vulnerability to attack – and much of this investment also helps reduce 
vulnerability to other forms of non-terrorist disruption.
And the potential impact of an attack, both in terms of initial damage and the duration of disruption, 
has been much reduced by the careful preparation of emergency response: command and control, 
communications, emergency services training, medical services, consular services overseas and 
local resilience networks at home and so on. The coroners report on 7/7 went over the ground in 
great detail, and those lessons have been absorbed by the authorities. Most commentators would 
accept that the UK is prepared for managing the aftermath of a range of calamities in a way that was 
certainly not the case at the time of 9/11.
In applying the counter-terrorism strategy, it has been essential to have sound intelligence on the 
threat and how it has developed. The creation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, JTAC, has at 
the operational level improved the ability to learn how terrorists think, how they operate and about 
fashions in attack methodologies. That is operational information that is essential in emergency 
planning including for the protection of first responders.
A fundamental principle in thinking about crisis management is that all emergencies are local in 
their impact. Most emergencies in the United Kingdom can be perfectly well handled at a local 
level by the appropriate emergency services, local authorities and agencies, often involving local 
volunteers from St Johns Ambulance or the Red Cross, with no direct involvement from Central 
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Government. The command buck stops with the local Gold Command when it comes to decisions 
regarding the safety of the public. But in complex emergencies there will be decisions that even a 
Chief Constable does not have the authority to take. Examples might be taking powers under the 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004, making emergency grants from the Treasury’s contingency fund, 
authorizing the deployment of the Armed Forces, negotiating with foreign governments and placing 
requirements upon the intelligence services. And more fundamentally, in major emergencies there is 
the important matter of selecting the national strategic aim for the management of the consequences 
and the subsequent recovery. The experience of the last decade is that the degree of media interest 
increasingly influences that level of central involvement.
The British authorities have learned lessons, some the hard way, about what could be described as 
the ‘thermodynamics’ of counter-terrorism: how the government can best exercise its primary duty 
to protect the public in the face of a severe terrorist threat and yet maintain civic harmony and 
uphold democratic values and the rule of law at home and internationally. There is a relationship 
between the vigour of emergency measures, taken to protect the public and to obtain intelligence to 
prevent attacks, and the level of confidence among all sections of the community in the 
government’s commitment to protect the liberties and rights of the citizen.
As with the thermodynamic relationship between the volume, pressure and temperature of a gas, too 
sudden an application of force to compress it and the temperature may rise dangerously to explosive 
levels; too little pressure applied and the gas is uncontained and will expand out of control. The best 
approach may well be to cool things down as you gradually build up the pressure, and certainly not 
to do things unnecessarily that heat it up – the influence of the invasion of Iraq has already been 
mentioned. There is after all no such thing as a risk free world and attempting ever higher levels of 
security will become oppressive and counter-productive.
Without pushing such an inexact analogy further, the point to be registered is that there is an inter-
relationship between a nation’s counter-terrorism efforts, their effect on the spread of the violent 
jihadist ideology and on civic harmony, civil liberties, and human rights. The strategic narrative 
governments choose to tell about what is going on based on their assessment of the threat and of the 
effects of the response, direct and indirect, is crucial to getting the thermodynamic judgment right.
Terrorists are mostly creatures of habit, for which the public should be grateful. The manifestations 
of terrorism may well follow well understood past tactics: aircraft hijackings, car and parcel 
bombing campaigns, kidnappings and assassinations. There are very serious crimes and the public 
will rightly expect the perpetrators to be pursued with vigour. The first and main lesson from the 
last decade is, however, the importance of affording the time and effort at the outset to be best able 
to judge the underlying nature and potential gravity of a terrorist threat. Only then can leaders be in 
a position to be able to calibrate the response appropriately and proportionately across all the levers 
open to government at home and abroad. This will never be an easy undertaking and there cannot 
be a ready-made heuristic to apply.
Parliament, public and the media, will have (vivid) ways of expressing their own implicit risk 
appetites and in the aftermath of some atrocity these are unlikely to be the same as those of the 
security authorities. Only with a well-grounded and explicable view of the nature of the threat and 
the consequences of possible responses can the different considerations be brought into an 
acceptable equilibrium that the public will accept as the best possible in the circumstances.
The public should look to government to decide in good time whether to act to try to reduce the risk 
further, or to act to reduce society’s vulnerability to it, or in some cases sensibly to decide to leave 
well alone. Anticipation places a great responsibility on the intelligence of those who are to provide 
strategic notice of emerging risks. That is certainly the case with terrorism, the threat that is the 
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subject of this conference. It places of course even more weight on the wisdom of those who have 
to decide whether and how to act upon such warning. As Machiavelli advised, ‘a Prince who is 
himself not wise cannot be well advised’.
Looking back, I would argue that the relevant UK risk judgments in the period after 9/11 have been 
shown to be broadly correct in the light of hindsight, although with some bumps and hard lessons 
learnt on the way.
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